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CONTRACTS-PAYNTER v. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: HOW
DISCRETIONARY ARE THE INHERENT
POWERS OF UNIVERSITIES?
On Thursday evening, April 30, 1970, President Nixon announced
that he had ordered American troops into Cambodia. The reaction to
this announcement at universities and campuses across the country was
spontaneous and immediate.' Millions of students were dismayed and
outraged and anti-war demonstrations were mounted everywhere. By
Sunday, May 3, 1970, tensions reflecting the growing disillusionment
and frustration of the students at the Washington Square Center of New
York University had built to such a pitch that the University president
called a special advisory meeting of the University Senate in an effort
to determine the most effective means of meeting and dealing with the
apparent crisis. 2
When four students were killed by a unit of the Ohio National Guard
at Kent State University on May 4, 1970, the situation grew more
serious all over the country. At New York University, the news of the
killings "immeasurably aggravated the already explosive situation."
School property was seized and violence and vandalism ensued. 4
On the evening of May 4, the president of the University suspended
formal classes until the school senate could meet and plan further action
to "protect the lives of students, faculty, and employees, and to safe-
guard the property of the University." 5 The buildings were cleared and
order restored by University officials and police, but the senate resolved
to suspend formal classes. "Resolutions were duly adopted permitting
each college in the University to assess its own particular situation and
to make rules and regulations concerning classes, examinations and
grades."
The School of Education and Washington Square College called off
formal classes for the final week of the semester, making provision for
1. Brief for Defendant-Appellant (New York University) at 5.
2. Id. at 5-6 (Transcript at 20-21).
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 6 (Transcript at 20-25).
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 7 (Transcript at 21-23, 32-34).
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the faculty to remain available in order that students could arrange for
the completion of their studies. 7 Students were given the options to ac-
cept letter grades based on completed assignments, or on additional as-
signments, or examinations. The student could also accept a grade of
"pass" or "fail" based upon his work in each course. 8  Thus, students
could take final examinations although formal classes were suspended.
The senate meeting was held on Thursday, May 7, 1970.9 The spring
semester was scheduled to end on Friday, May 15, with final examina-
tions to be held between May 16 and May 29.10 Formal classes were
officially suspended for a total of nine days-from May 5 to May 15.
On July 15, 1970, an action was commenced in the Civil Court of
the City of New York, Small Claims Part, County of New York, by
Roger Paynter, the father of a student who was enrolled in the School
of Education of New York University, Washington Square Center, when
classes were suspended in May of that year. The plaintiff sued for
breach of contract claiming a refund of part of his son's tuition based on
instruction time lost from the date of suspension of classes until the
original closing date of the University.
Judge Patrick Picariello, in a five page decision, found for the plain-
tiff and awarded him $277.40 with interest from May 6, 1970 and
costs." The judge found that "[tihe defendant breached its contract
during its lifetime. It matters not in what point in its duration."'
1 2
Paynter v. New York University, 64 Misc. 2d 226, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676
(1970).
The defendant, New York University, appealed to the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, Appellate Term: First Department (Index
Number 49352/1970). The Appellate term unanimously reversed
Judge Picariello's decision.1 3  No comment has been made as to a possi-
ble appeal by plaintiff to the New York Court of Appeals.
The purpose of this casenote is to analyze the Paynter decision in the
light of inherent rule-making powers of a university and the non-inter-
vention policy of the courts, taking into consideration issues of contrac-
7. Id. at 7 (Transcript at 27-28).
8. Id. at 8 (Transcript at 22, 27, 28).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 4.
11. 64 Misc. 2d 226, 231, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 680 (1970).
12. id.
13. Paynter v. New York University, 35 App. 2d -, 319 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1971).
See also McFadden, New York Times, Apr. 5, 1971, at 1. col. 4.
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tual obligations and performance, and the corresponding duties of par-
ties to a contract. Cursory comment shall be made on the decision of
the Small Claims Court (as this was an issue on appeal). However,
the major concern of the Paynter decision is how it affects colleges and
universities across the country in regard to suspension of classes due to
disturbances, as well as instruction time lost due to absenteeism of faculty
and staff. Allusions will be made to disciplinary actions of universities,
as this too is an example of an inherent power of universities.
Our first inquiry is that of breach of contract in general, since the
Small Claims Court seemingly decided the Paynter case strictly on this
ground. Although Judge Picariello discussed at length the duties of the
university with regard to dissemination of information and the mainte-
nance of order on the campus, his final analysis was that no matter
what was taking place at the Washington Square Center campus, New
York University breached its contractual obligation to give instruction to
the son of Roger Paynter until the scheduled close of the semester.laa
Since the issue of breach of contract was raised, it should be dis-
cussed before the questionable reasoning of Judge Picariello can be
analyzed.
In order to lawfully "breach" a contract, one of several rules must
be applied. In accordance with the general rule, if a party desires to
be excused from performance in the event of a contingency arising, it
was his duty to provide therefore in his contract, 1 4 at least where he
14. After a recitation of the facts-as stated above-Judge Picariello launched
his attack on the defendant University in a seemingly extraneous manner. He
began by saying, "This latest circumstance [alleged absence of students at defendant's
Senate meeting when school closing was affirmed], combined with the distressing
and appalling situation then pertaining on the defendant's campuses, impels the
Court to inquire whether the Senate action reflects a condition of its isolation
from environmental influences then existing, indifference to its legal obligations to
the student body as a whole and to its moral responsibility to Society. Let us
now examine the power of defendant's Board of Trustees to . . . use ... its
property as they shall deem for the best interests of the institution ...... 64 Misc.
2d 226, 227, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1970). Judge Picariello went on to discuss
the duties and raison d'&re of the university in America. "Universities are schools
of education and schools of research. * * * The justification for a university is
that it preserves connection between knowledge and the zest of life, by uniting the
young and old in the imaginative consideration of learning. The university im-
parts information, but it imparts it imaginatively. At least this is the function it
should perform for society." 64 Misc. 2d 226, 228, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1970).
The Court cited two authorities in the above discussion: Whitehead, "THE AIMS OF
EDUCATION," and "SoCIAL STATUS," pt. 11, ch. 17, Section 4.
The Judge continued by stating: "Indeed, the task of a university is to weld to-
gether imagination and experience." 64 Misc. 2d 226, 228, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678
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could have anticipated the event.' 5
If . . . [the risk of the supervening event] was foreseeable there should have been
provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives rise to the
inference that the risk was assumed.' 6
Thus, except where a statute provides otherwise, 17 performance is not
excused by subsequent inability to perform,' or by mere incon-
venience.' 9  Similarly, performance is not excused by mere un-
pleasantness, 20 by unforeseen hardship, 2' or unforeseen difficulties. 22
Where the question of excuse of performance is raised, several argu-
ments may be made to support the position. The possible defenses to
an action based upon failure to perform are failure of consideration,
both complete and partial on a unilateral basis; impossibility; con-
tractual provisions pertaining to performance; absence of bad faith;
(1970). Continuing he then discussed the necessity of student-faculty communi-
cations and a "convocation" to supervise campus activities and troubles. This dis-
cussion, serving as an admonition to the defendant, as well as to Kent State
University: "The Court shudders to wonder if the catastrophe which befell that
college campus . . . might not have been averted had this program [informal stu-
dent-faculty discussions] been pursued.", and all other universities to keep channels
of communication open to avoid unrest. This section of the opinion of the Small
Claims Court is dictum and will be favorably alluded to in the conclusion of this
casenote. The fact remained, however, that Judge Picariello used his position as a
forum for comment on the actions of college administrations, rather than deciding
the case on principles of law. He found the defendant liable for breach of contract
without weighing the possibility that an "education" had been proffered, although
classes had ended early.
15. Leonard v. Autocar Sales and Service Co., 392 111. 182, 64 N.E.2d 477(1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 804 (1946). See SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, § 676 (1938 rev. ed.).
16. L.N. Jackson and Co. v. Lorentzen, 83 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); rev'd
on other grounds, L.N. Jackson v. Royal Norwegian Co., 177 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950); Montauk Corp. v. Seeds, 215 Md. 491,
138 A.2d 907 (1958).
17. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944). Cf. SELEC-
TIONS FROM WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 808 (1938 rev. ed.); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS, § 301 (1932).
18. Hughes v. Breazeale, 240 La. 126, 121 So. 2d 510 (1960); Niblett Farms v.
Markley-Bankhead, Inc., 202 La. 982, 13 So. 2d 287 (1943). But performance
held not excused under statute in Selby v. Battley, 149 Cal. App. 2d 659, 309 P.2d
120 (1957).
19. Platt v. Fischer, 285 Ill. App. 110, 1 N.E.2d 735 (1936). Caron v.
Andrew, 133 Cal. App. 2d 402, 284 P.2d 544 (1955).
20. Smith v. Farmer's State Bank, 390 Ill. 374, 61 N.E.2d 557 (1945).
21. LiVolsi Construction Co. v. Shepard, 133 Conn. 133, 48 A.2d 263 (1946);
Godburn v. Meserve, 130 Conn. 723, 37 A.2d 235 (1944).
22. Kiyoichi Fujikawa v. Sunrise Soda Water Works Co., 158 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832, reh. denied, 332 U.S. 785; Butler v. Nepple,
54 Cal. 2d 589, 6 Cal. Rptr. 767, 354 P.2d 239 (1960).
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and frustration of the purpose of the contract. These defenses will be
considered in the above order, beginning with failure of consideration.
There is a failure of consideration where one party who has given
or promised to give some performance fails, without his fault, to re-
ceive, in some material respect, the agreed exchange for that per-
formance. 23 In its precise sense, the defense of failure of consideration
rests not on facts existing at the time the mutual promises bargained
for in a bilateral contract are made, but on some fact or contingency
which occurs between the time of the making of the contract and the
performance thereof which results in the material failure of performance
by one party. 24  Another view of the doctrine of failure of considera-
tion looks at a bilateral contract as a totality. It was felt in Hurlburt v.
Kephart25 that:
there can . . . be no such thing as a failure of consideration. The promisor either
receives the consideration he has bargained for, or he does not. If he does not, then
there is no enforceable agreement, for there is no consideration .... 26
The court in Paynter felt that this was true, since they held for the
breach, notwithstanding the length of time remaining in the semester.
27
The next defense considered is that of supervening impossibility. It
has generally been held that supervening impossibility is an excuse
for non-performance provided there is no contributory fault on the
part of the promisor. 28  When the performance of a contract is rendered
impossible due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, the
party failing to perform is exonerated. 29  The event that creates the
impossibility must be a fortuitous one, and not the voluntary act of the
23. Deibler v. Bernard Bros., 385 Ill. 610, 53 N.E.2d 450 (1944); United States
v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
24. Durkee v. Busk, 355 P.2d 588 (Alas. 1960); Guimarra v. Harrington
Heights, 33 N.J. Super. 178, 109 A.2d 695 (1954), affd, 18 N.J. 548, 114 A.7d
720 (1955).
25. Boswell v. Reid, 199 Cal. App. 2d 705, 19 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1962); Benson v.
Andrews, 138 Cal. App. 2d 123, 292 P.2d 39 (1955); Taliaferro v. Davis, 216
Cal. App. 2d 398, 31 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1963).
26. 50 Colo. 353, 115 P. 521 (1911).
27. Hurlburt v. Kephart, supra note 25, at 362, 115 P. at 524. See also
Myers v. Council Mfg. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Sonnichsen v.
Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. 659, 239 A.2d 63 (1967).
28. Supra note 1, at 4.
29. Dolman v. United States Trust Co., 206 Misc. 929, 134 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1954),
af'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 809, 148 N.Y.S.2d 809, rev'd on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 110,
157 N.Y.S.2d 537, 138 N.E.2d 784 (1956); Bissell v. Edison, 9 Mich. App. 276,
156 N.W.2d 623 (1967).
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promisor, as in closing down his business.30 The question of subse-
quent impossibility is not a decided rule of law in all jurisdictions.
Under a number of authorities, the promisor is not discharged. 31
Several authorities hold that the impossibility which will, or may, excuse
the performance of a contract must be concerned with the nature of the
thing to be done, and not in the inability or incapacity of the promisor,
or obligor, to do it.3 2  This last view applied to the Paynter situation,
where the events leading to the closing of N.Y.U. were not caused
by or under the control of the University. 33 Furthermore, the Univer-
sity was able to perform, but could not [or would not] due to the
national and local circumstances following the killings at Kent State.3 4
It followed, then, that Paynter could have been decided on the
grounds of a situation of impossibility which arose subsequent to the
entrance into a tuition contract, where such subsequent situation was
not the fault of the University. Because of this fortuitous situation,
the promisor was precluded from performing by external circumstances.
However, the consideration of subsequent impossibility, although pat-
ently germane to the fact situation, was not employed by the defense
either at trial or on appeal.
Another defense which must be considered relates to specific pro-
visions in a contract excusing performance. A provision in a con-
tract that performance shall be excused in the event of certain con-
tingencies is valid, but it cannot be extended to cover contingencies
not specifically provided for therein.35 What this means is that where
a person by his contract charges himself with an obligation that is
possible and can be lawfully performed, he must perform it.s6
30. Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Co., 170 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1961); Dudley v.
Boise Cascade Corp., 76 Wash. 2d 466, 457 P.2d 586 (1969).
31. Del. Martin v. Star Publishing Co., 50 Del. 181, 126 A.2d 238 (1956).
32. Phelps v. School Dist. #109, 302 I11. 193, 134 N.E. 312 (1922); Industrial
Natural Gas Co. v. Sunflower Natural Gas Co., 330 Ill. App. 343, 71 N.E.2d 199
(1947); Platt v. Fischer, 285 I11. App. 110, 1 N.E.2d 735 (1936).
33. Deibler v. Bernard Bros., 385 Ill. 610, 53 N.E.2d 450 (1944); Pioneer Life
Ins. v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 576, 30 N.E.2d 66 (1940); Crown Ice
Machine Leasing Co. v. Sam Senter Farms Inc., 174 So. 2d 614 (Fla. App. 1965).
34. "Every effort was . . . made by the administration and the faculty to calm
the students and to direct their energies away from violence and into constructive
channels." Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 6-7 (Transcript at 27).
35. Formal classes were suspended for the final week of the semester and
provision was made for the faculty members to make themselves available to all
students to assist them in arranging for the completion of their studies. Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, at 7 (Transcript at 26-28).
36. Whelling Valley Coal Corp. v. Mead, 186 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1950),
28 A.L.R.2d 1007.
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In Paynter there was no actual contractual stipulation excusing per-
formance in times of crisis on the campus. Nonetheless, there was a
statement in the University bulletin which referred to the fact that
the University's academic programs were expressly subject to change
without notice, at the discretion of the administration,3 7 and this was
relied upon by the University in their defense.As  Although Judge
Picariello regarded this statement as "too specious to merit any consid-
eration,"3 9 it should not have been ignored by the court. 40  The school
bulletin was a statement of University policy, giving constructive notice
to students of these particular standards and stipulations. There was
no mention of Paynter's son expressing any displeasure or taking any
exception to this or any other University policy made known to him
on or about the time the tuition contract was entered into.41
A correlative of this issue of avoiding the terms of a contract by
stipulation of possible situations whereby performance will be excused
is the question of bad faith on the part of the party allegedly failing
to perform. The absence of bad faith in failure to perform may be
a material factor in determining whether non-performance is excused. 42
The final defense to be considered is frustration of contractual pur-
pose, also a material factor, but nonetheless absent in this case. Im-
possibility of performance of a contract may be subjective, or ob-
jective and due to the incapacity of the particular person who has
37. Platt v. Fischer, 285 Il1. App. 110, 1 N.E.2d 735 (1936); Zeff v. Farring-
ton, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Bayview Gen. Hosp. v. Assoc. Hosp.
Service, 45 Misc. 2d 218, 256 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1964).
38. 64 Misc. 2d 226, 230-31, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 680 (1970).
39. See supra note 1, at 14, wherein the defendant University commented on the
court's disregard for the bulletin by stating, "This explicit written provision [power
to change] of the contract was before the Court; it should not have been ignored."
40. Supra note 38, at 230-231.
41. Supra note 1, at 14.
42. The adherence by defendant N.Y.U. to the binding power of the bulletin
raises the question of just how binding is a policy statement in a university bulle-
tin? On appeal, the court found an implied right on the part of college officials
to make minor alterations in classes,- and that the closing of the entire school to
be just as "insubstantial" a change. Paynter v. New York University, 35 App. 2d
-, 319 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894. The appellate court here is consolidating full-scale
closing of an entire university within the ambit of superficial room or curricula
alterations. Is there not an important distinction between these two actions?
By impliedly binding the student to the mandates of the bulletin is not the court
blindly assuming that the bulletin is carefully read by the applicant prior to tender
of tuition? In order to hold the bulletin so binding, should it not be offered for
perusal when the tuition contract is entered into? This could be readily compared
with garage claim tickets, tickets to sports events, or other similar circumstances
wherein a party tries to limit his contractual or tort liability by disclaimer clauses.
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undertaken to do the thing.43 This, in essence, is the doctrine of frus-
tration. Performance of the terms of a contract is excused if the pur-
pose thereof is frustrated by law or an emergency situation. The doc-
trine is infrequently invoked and recognized by the courts even less
often. 44
The applicability of this tenuous doctrine of commercial frustration
to the Paynter case was a moot point. The inherent difficulty in de-
termining whether or not frustration applied was that the court's in-
terpretation of the facts and the doctrine was the deciding factor. It
could have been argued that due to the emergency situation on campus,
and the desire of New York University to save lives and safeguard
property, the University should have been absolved from performance
of its obligation to keep the schools open.45 The result of such a defense
being pursued in this or any other similar action is, however, un-
known.
The preceding doctrines for excuse of performance of a contract
could have been employed by the University, or by the plaintiff in
response to N.Y.U. denials. The contract questions discussed above
were given very little exposure in the University's appellate brief,4 6 and
cursory observance by the lower court judge. Thus, no reasons were
given for the court's conclusion that "the defendant breached its con-
tract during its lifetime."' 47  The lower court did not consider or even
mention the terms of the contract, the obligations of the University
thereunder, or the acts constituting the breach. The University, as
appellant, claimed these failures to be reversible error.
48
43. Lutz v. Currence, 91 W. Va. 225, 112 S.E. 506 (1922).. Bad faith was not
raised in Paynter, although the issue could have been raised in a hypothetical sit-
uation. That is, did the defendant University act in bad faith by closing its doors
and not continuing formal classes. The argument here would have been tenuous,
but, had the closing come earlier in the semester, it might have been feasibly ar-
gued that "locking out" the student body from their bargained for classes was
acting in bad faith.
44. Smith Eng. Co. v. Rice, 102 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 637 (1939); The B's Co. v. B.P. Barber, 391 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1968).
45. Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DE PAUL L. REV.
1 (1953).
46. Supra note 12, at 6.
47. Defendant University claimed that plaintiff gave no evidence as to the,
terms of the contract. Defendant stated further that no reasons were given for the
court's finding of the breach. The University alluded to New York's substantive
law, pointing out requisite elements for finding liability for breach of contract.
Defendant finally discussed the question of the entirety of tuition contracts and
found them to be entire and indivisible. Supra note 1, at 11, 14, 16-20, and
21-23.
48. Supra note 11.
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In Point II of its argument, 49 the University did discuss the tuition
contract made with the plaintiff's son, mainly in terms of error promul-
gated in the lower court in dealing with it. The University stated in
its appellate brief that:
in order to find liability for breach of contract under New York Law, it is neces-
sary to establish the terms of the contract, the nature of the contractual obligation
alleged to have been breached and the facts evidencing breach. 50
The appellant University further suggested that:
although the courts could have looked to the interest of the parties in the formation
of the contract, it could not alter any of the terms of the contract under the guise
of interpretation. 5'
In its brief, the University further stated that this rule of contracts
applied to tuition contracts, and had been so applied by New York
courts for nearly a century. 2
Since several doctrines concerning excuse of performance were not
used in connection with Paynter, the foremost questions to be con-
sidered forthwith are what rights and obligations are inherent in a
contract for tuition and did the University have certain inherent rights
exclusive of judicial intervention?
When a student enters a tax-supported college or university, he cre-
ates a contractual relationship with that school, whereby, attendance
may be considered a right by the prospective student. In the case of
private institutions, this is a matter of strictly contractual agreement
between the institution and its students.53  This point was accepted by
49. Supra note 1, at 14.
50. Supra note 1, at 15. Point II is captioned, "THE FAILURE OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO APPLY THE SETTLED RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF
SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN THE INSTANT CASE DEPRIVES THE UNIVER-
SITY OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE."
51. Supra note 1, at 16. See also Clark v. N.B.C., 28 Misc. 2d 481, 209 N.Y.S.
2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
52. Supra note 1, at 17. See also Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 N.Y.2d
42, 133 N.E.2d 688 (1956); Wilson Sullivan Co. v. International Paper Makers
Realty Corp., 307 N.Y. 20, 119 N.E.2d 573 (1954); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915), motion for reargument de-
nied.
53. Carr v. St. John's University, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410,
aff'd. without opinion, 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962); Anthony v.
Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Van Brink v. Leh-
man, 199 App. Div. 784, 192 N.Y.S. 342 (1922); Goldstein v. New York Uni-
versity, 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902); People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellvue
Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (1891), aff'd. on opinion
below, 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891); Jones v. Vassar College, 59 Misc. 2d
296, 299 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1969); William v. Stein, 100 Misc. 677, 166 N.Y.S. 836
(1917).
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both the plaintiff and defendant in Paynter.54  In its brief, defendant
asserted further that since the student was not required to enter, the
university may impose such reasonable conditions upon his entrance as
it deemed proper."5 The defendant felt that such conditions were a part
of the implied tuition contract and were binding upon the parties.
Thus-impliedly under this theory-a student seeking to recover on
the contract is bound by all of its provisions and may not be permitted
to repudiate one part in order to recover on another.5 6  The de-
fendant suggested then, that the tuition contract was entire and indi-
visible. 57
The plaintiff, Paynter, on the contrary, considered the contract to
be a divisible one. He considered the tuition to be based upon the
number of credits attached to a course, which, in turn, were based upon
the numbers of hours of classroom lecture, laboratory and so forth. The
consideration for the tuition payment, therefore, would have been the
promise by the University to offer the student the opportunity to at-
tend a certain number of lectures of a certain duration.58 In essence,
Paynter prayed for a proportionate refund because the University kept
his son from receiving a definite number of hours in class that he,
Paynter, had contracted for.59
The University countered the plaintiff's argument of a divisible con-
tract by stating that:
A student is entitled to pursue the educational program for which he has enrolled
and if, by reason of a university's breach of contract, he is prevented from doing
so, he may recover all that he has paid. In short, it is a course of study which the
university must provide, and, if it fails at all, it fails completely. 60 (emphasis added)
In Kabus v. Seftner,61 the court held:
The plaintiff should have received all or nothing, for the contract was entire and
54. Howard College v. Turner, 71 Ala. 429 (1882). See also People ex rel.
Tinkoff v. Northwestern University, 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 344 (1947), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948).
55. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 18. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 3.
56. See Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(1928).
57. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 18.
58. See, e.g., William v. Stein, 100 Misc. 677, 166 N.Y.S. 836 (1917); Kabus v.
Seftner, 34 Misc. 538, 69 N.Y.S. 983 (1901); Drucker v. New York University,
59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1969), afj'd. without opinion, 23 App. Div. 2d
1106, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1970).
59. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 4.
60. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 21.
61. 34 Misc. 538, 69 N.Y.S. 983 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
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indivisible. The defendants agreed to qualify the plaintiff for a particular examina-
tion. If they failed to do that they were entitled to no compensation. On the other
hand, if the acts of the plaintiff prevented them from living up to their contract, he
forfeited the entire amount paid for his tuition. Under the contract in evidence
there could not be part performance and a partial recovery on some theory of quan-
tum meruit. 6
2
The defendant agreed with plaintiff's stand that the tuition was re-
fundable if the University breached its obligation to instruct a student
in courses agreed upon when the contract went into effect. The main
point in contention then was whether the University offered class hours
or a course of study for the tuition paid. In Anthony v. Syracuse
University, the court held that one "matriculating at a university es-
tablishes a contractual relationship under which, upon compliance with
all reasonable regulations as to scholastic standing, attendance, deport-
ment, payment of tuition, and otherwise, he is entitled to pursue his
selected course to completion. .... 63
The Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Term,
First Department held in Paynter (on appeal by N.Y.U.), that:
while in a strict sense, a student contracts with a college or university for a number
62. 34 Misc. 538, 539-40, 69 N.Y.S. 983, 984 (Sup. Ct. 1901). In the Kabus
case, the plaintiff, a student, sought to recover tuition fees for defendant uni-
versity's failure to give him the necessary instruction to enable him to pass the exam-
ination given by the state board of regents.. The Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
held that it was error to allow a proportionate recovery for the instruction which
plaintiff (student) did not receive by his being suspended for improper conduct.
Since the contract was entire and indivisible, :the plaintiff was either entitled to
total recovery or forfeiture. The Court here held the latter to be the case.
63. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 490, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 438
(1928). The plaintiff (a student) was dismissed from defendant university and
brought suit to be restored to the student body. Plaintiff had signed a card upon
registration at the university promising to comply with regulations of the uni-
versity, including those of conduct. It seems that plaintiff violated these regula-
tions, precipitating his dismissal. See also, supra note 59, at 12-13, for comments
on divisibility.
Are the two promises for this contract mutually exclusive? If the student does
not comply with "reasonable" regulations must the university still supply the
"course of study;" and, conversely, if the university fails to supply the requisite
elements of the "course of study," is the student compelled to comply? If a student
in a law school contracts for a course of study in law with the understood goal of
passing the bar examination of his state, does he have recourse to the law school if
he fails the bar due to an incomplete or non-existant course in-for instance-
equity? Does the student have a right against the school for the cost of retaking the
exam due to the school's failure to fulfill its contractual obligation to provide a
"course of study" to prepare a student for the bar (assuming full compliance on
the part of the student with all school regulations). The same situation would
apply to an accountant hoping to become certified or the medical student work-
ing to achieve his M.D. and state certification.
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of courses to be given during the academic year, the services rendered by the
university cannot be measured by the time spent in a classroom.6 4
Thus, the court found that there was no breach by the University, and
consequently the lower court was reversed.
The final point concerning the tuition contract in Paynter revolved
around the University bulletin and the "emergency" change in the
school's closing date. In Texas Military College v. Taylor, the court
decided that although a college or university catalogue may be binding
as a written contract where the student enters under the terms of the
catalogue, there is nothing to prevent the parties from making a con-
tract different from that contemplated by such catalogue. 65  Plaintiff,
Paynter, stated in its brief that, as a general rule, a contract cannot
be modified or altered without the consent of all parties thereto.66
New York University saw its actions in modifying the bulletin as an
exercise of its discretionary power of control over academic programs
and requirements6 7 and a contractual right stated in the bulletin itself.6 8
Also holding in favor of this point was Samson v. Trustees of Columbia
University, where the court found that:
[t]he institution . . . obligated itself--subject, of course, to changes of plan, cur-
riculum and the like-to permit a student in good standing to continue the particular
course for which he has entered, upon payment of the necessary fees and compli-
ance with other reasonable requirements.6 9 (emphasis added)
Other courts have held that the ordinary contractual relation of tuition
for a course of study is subject to modification by the university regu-
lations assented to by the student.70
The court reviewing Paynter held that the insubstantial change
64. 319 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (1971). This statement will be further considered
in the conclusion of this casenote.
65. Texas Military College v. Taylor, 275 S.W. 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
66. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, wherein, Alcon v. Kinton Realty Inc., 2
A.D.2d 454, 156 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1956), is cited as authority.
67. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 20.
68. It stated in the bulletin that, subject to change at the discretion of the ad-
ministration, the spring semester would commence on February 2, and end on
May 15 (Emphasis added). Supra note 1, at 4.
69. 101 Misc. 146, 148, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd. without opinion,
181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1917). Plaintiff, a student at defendant
Columbia University, was dropped from the student body for actions held to consti-
tute misconduct. In other words, plaintiff had not complied with the reasonable
requirements of the University that students not interfere with the running of the
University or impair its control over the student body.
70. See, e.g., Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S.
435 (1928).
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made in the schedule of classes did not permit a recovery of tuition. 7"
The probable rationale for this decision was the fact that the students
of New York University lost only a few days of class instruction, the
bulk of time lost by the closing being days set aside strictly for final
examinations. 72 Since these examinations could have been made up or by-
passed by options open to the students at plaintiff's son's college, 73
the "breach" by defendant was patently inconsequential. And even if
it were not, by tacit assent to the University bulletin Paynter impliedly
agreed to such a change.
The foregoing discussion leads directly to an examination of the in-
herent rule-making authority of universities. Are universities allowed
to promulgate rules and regulations governing student dress, conduct and
attendance, etc. 74 ; and if so, what are the limits on these powers? Is
there any "due process" requirement? Is there judicial review? In
its brief, New York University asserted that:
the promulgation of rules and regulations whereunder formal classes were suspended
and students were offered various options for the completion of their courses 75
was within the discretionary powers of the administration.76
The right of private universities to manage their internal affairs
without coercion or outside interference has hardly been open to doubt
since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodword.77 In New York, the applicable rule
is that:
private universities are governed on the principles of academic freedom, and, where a
matter is within the discretionary powers of the university administration and where
there is no showing that the exercise of such power was arbitrary, capricious or
illegal, a court has no right to substitute its judgment for that of the administra-
tion. 78
Clearly the scope of judicial review is limited.
71. 319 N.Y.S.2d 893, at 894 (1971).
72. Supra note 1. Quaere: Would the Court have arrived at the same con-
clusion if forty days of instruction time had been lost?
73. Supra note 1, at 8.
74. See also Comment: The Legality of Dress Codes for Students, 20 DE PAUL
L. REv. 222 (1970).
75. Supra note 1, at 8.
76. See, e.g., Harte v. Adelphi University, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1970, at 19, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.).
77. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
78. See, e.g., Lesser v. Bd. of Education, 18 App. Div. 2d 388, 239 N.Y.S.2d
776 (1963); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 198 App. Div.
460, 191 N.Y.S. 349 (1921); Beta Sigma Rho, Inc. v. Moore, 46 Misc. 2d 1030,
1972]
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The goal of a university is to maintain a climate adequately suitable
for the advancement of learning. A natural concomitant, therefore, is
that the university can promulgate its own rules to uphold this academic
atmosphere, and take any necessary steps to punish or forestall con-
duct implicitly deleterious to the university system. Thus, a further
rationale for the inherent discretionary powers of the university is sus-
tained by the basic needs of higher learning institutions themselves. 79
Along with this inherent power there is a corresponding responsibility
on the part of the student to observe the university's rules and regula-
tions.""
After the student enters a contracted agreement with a private uni-
versity, and has impliedly agreed to conform with rules of conduct, the
question necessarily arises as "to whom conduct must be 'acceptable,'
and what is 'proper,' and what does 'good taste' require."' In Buttny
v. Smiley, the court ruled that regulations and rules which are neces-
sary in maintaining order and discipline are always considered rea-
sonable.8 2  In addition to the inherent power theory, the district court
indicated that university regulations for students need not meet the
requirements of specificity imposed upon state statutes, since the goals
261 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd. mem., 25 App. Div. 2d 719, 269 N.Y.S.
2d 1012 (1966); Edde v. Columbia University, 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643
(Sup. Ct. 1957), alf'd., 16 App. Div. 2d 780, 175 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1958), appeal
dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 881, 182 N.Y.S.2d 828, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 956 (1959);
People ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, 68 Hun. 118, 22 N.Y.S. 663
(1893); see also Carr v. St. John's University, Anthony v. Syracuse University,
Goldstein v. New York University, Jones v. Vassar College, supra note 53. For an
Illinois view on the exercise of "corporate" powers by a university, see People
ex rel. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321,
46 N.E.2d 951 (1943).
79. It is a truism that a student at a private university is there as a matter of
privilege, and not as of right, as in state schools. Since privileges may be re-
vocable by the grantor, the question arises of affording the grantee--the private
university student-procedural safeguards prior to a revocation. See also Buttny v.
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.C.D. Colo. 1968), wherein it was stated: "University
authorities have an inherent general power to maintain order on campus .... ;" and
Due v. Florida A. & M. University, 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963), which
concurs. See generally Project: Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A
Comparison of Law and Practice, 1970 DUKE L.J. 763, 773, 795.
80. "Colleges and universities have the inherent power to promulgate reasonable
rules and regulations for government of the university community; likewise, stu-
dents have corresponding responsibilities and their observance of those rules and
regulations." Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747,
757 (W.D. La. 1968); see also Goldberg v. Regents of University of California,
248 Cal. App. 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
81. See Note, 29 OHIo L.J. 1023 (1968).
82. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
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and purposes of the university, as well as the nature of the institution,
are peculiarly different.83
A study of American case law has indicated that arguments against
university rules based upon due process or vagueness have not met
with success. The courts have seldom overturned disciplinary actions
whether taken by public or private universities.8 4  These actions were
taken in accordance with what might be called an "academic judg-
ments" rule. The tendency has been to treat the academic adminis-
trator's judgment in the same fashion as the business judgments of a
corporate director. The deference has extended, however, from the
academic realm to the realm of conduct, in which the expertise of the
court is unsurpassed. 8 5
The courts seem to have been completely excluded in the determina-
tion of matters involving university policies. In Carr v. St. John's Uni-
versity, the court held that:
when a university, in expelling a student, acts within its jurisdiction, not arbitrarily
but in exercise of an honest discretion based on facts within its knowledge that
justify the exercise of discretion, a court may not review the exercise of discretion.8 6
In Goldberg v. Regents of California, upon finding that the univer-
sity had "inherent power" to dismiss the students for their actions,
the court refused to consider the extensively briefed vagueness claim. 87
Such inherent powers are not exclusively possessed by the universities
and they are applicable at the high school level as well.88
In Paynter, the Supreme Court of the State of New York adhered
83. Jones v. State Bd. of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
see also Steier v. New York State Educ. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educa-
tion, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
84. Due v. Florida A. & M. University, supra note 79; Dehaan v. Brandeis Uni-
versity, 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton
College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204
(1913); Carr v. St. John's University and Anthony v. Syracuse University, supra
note 53; People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany, supra note 78; and Goldberg v. Re-
gents of University of California, supra note 80.
85. "Such rules of deference should be extended only to areas where the courts
lack expertise and are unable to easily become knowledgeable." Note, 29 (OHIO
L.J. 1023, 1024 (1968)). See note 83 supra.
86. Supra note 53, at 632. See e.g., People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany, supra
note 78; People ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, supra note 78;
People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellvue Hosp. Medical College, supra note 53.
87. Goldberg v. Regents, supra note 80.
88. McGee v. Board of Education, District #209, Docket No. 71C1871 (N.D.
Ill., filed Aug. 18, 1971), dismissed, Feb. 13, 1972; Appeal will be taken.
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(on appeal) to the reasoning of the pro-university decisions discussed
above. A unanimous court held that:
Private colleges and universities are governed on the principal of self-regulation, free
to a large degree, from judicial restraints ... and they have inherent authority to
maintain order on their campuses. In the light of the events on the defendant's
campus and in college communities throughout the country on May 4 and 5, 1970,
the [lower] court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the university admin-
istrators and in concluding that the university was unjustified in suspending classes
for the time remaining in the school year prior to the examination period. The cir-
cumstances of the relationship permit the implication that the professor or the col-
lege may make minor changes in this regard. The insubstantial change made in
the schedule of classes does not permit a recovery of tuition. We conclude that
substantial justice was not done between the parties 'according to the rules and prin-
ciples of substantial law'. . . . (emphasis added)8 9
Accordingly, the decision of Judge Picariello was reversed and the
complaint of Roger Paynter was dismissed.
IMPLICATIONS OF PAYNTER V. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.90
The decision in Paynter v. New York University had a two-fold
significance. First, the court sought to define "an education" and sec-
ondly, it re-enforced a firmly established judicial practice of not re-
viewing discretionary decisions made by trustees of universities."
The court was reasonable in its decision to the extent that it felt
that Paynter's son did, in fact, receive the education he had contracted
for. The time spent in the classroom is not the sole criterion for de-
ciding whether or not the education bargained for has been received.
College courses are bound by ridiculously few constants (e.g. textbooks,
syllabi, bulletin synopses). It is the variables-the professor and his
personality, preparation, knowledge, et al-which decide how a course
will be taught. It is obvious that the same course taught by different
instructors will have varied results, perhaps the least of which is the
strong possibility that one professor may conclude his presentation of
the required course material before the other. It therefore appears to
be true that "the services rendered by the university cannot be meas-
ured by the time spent in a classroom"92 -up to a certain extent.
89. Paynter v. New York University, 35 App. 2d -, 319 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894
(1971).
90. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); see also Note, 29
OHIo L.J. 1023, n.86 (1968).
91. Supra notes 83, 84, 85.
92. Supra note 64, at 894.
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The logic of the court here was basically sound, but it failed to con-
sider an important factor. Ouaere: Since it was decided that time
spent in the classroom was not the only determinant of a university's
performance, is it not possible that the loss of a number of class hours
can constitute a breach of contract? Professors may miss classes due
to professional demands, personal business, speaking engagements, and
a myriad of other reasons. Is this enough to constitute a breach?
The pass-fail option, as offered by -the Senate of N.Y.U.,9 3 for example,
may not compensate for the laxity of a law professor who knowingly
allows his private practice to take him from the classroom and his
contractual duty to instruct. A half-hearted presentation or frequent
lapses between class meetings (as well as concentrated, last-minute
make-up "jam" sessions) can have a deleterious effect upon students
who pay tuition to learn in a continuous and conscientious process and
not in scattered sessions.94
Although Paynter raised the issue of time in class, it may not es-
cape scrutiny on the question of quality of education. The fact that
classes were nearly completed before final examinations when N.Y.U.
closed implied that all course matter approached a level of entirety. The
presumption, though, was a rebuttable one. The spectre of quality and
quantity of education hovers over the outcome of the case. Time and
documentation do not permit an attempted complete answer to this
grave problem at the present time.95
93. Supra note 1, at 8.
94. The Paynter case involves a student working toward a bachelor's degree.
His final grades in college may have some bearing on his post-graduate courses or
employment. The fact that he did not receive the "full measure" of his classes
probably will not have a great effect upon his future plans. Consider, however, the
plight of a law student, whose classes and their content directly apply to his
passage of the bar examination, which in turn bears upon his future earnings.
Would such a student have any recourse if, for instance, he received only a partial
course in civil practice, and thereby failed his state's bar? Would the university, as
employer of the professor, be liable to the student for the cost of retaking the bar
exam; or for a bar review course; or even for a projected figure of loss of future
earnings? When a law school contracts (this comes within the ambit of the tuition
contract) with a student, it either explicitly or impliedly agrees that the student will
be prepared to take a bar exam, by having been offered the requisite courses.
When a course or courses are improperly taught or otherwise not completed, does
the university become liable for breach of contract? Does the deprived student
have standing to demand some type of relief? Or will the courts dismiss the action
based on a Paynter theory on non-intervention in matters of discretionary decisions
by university trustees? It appears that these hypothetical issues should come under
the purview of the courts.
95. Should not universities be responsible for the quality of the education they
offer by contractual obligation? At least a student-faculty committee could be
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The second implication of the Paynter decision-that of inherent
powers-can only be given cursory coverage, since no answer has been
forthcoming to this date. This is due to the paradoxical aspect of
these "powers." The university must be able to exercise certain discre-
authorized to hear critical (and constructive) opinions on classes and instructors to
maintain some standards for education. Otherwise, would the university be liable
for poor quality dissemination of information by poor quality of absentee professors?
Can a university be allowed to go unchecked if it accepts money from a student
who in good faith expects an "education" and receives something less through no
fault of his own?
The question can also be raised at this juncture as to the performance of the
university if it closes its doors during the academic session for some reason. If the
student can sue for pro rata refund of tuition, can the university be allowed to
mitigate damages? Would a plan for finals or a pass-fail grade-as in Paynter-
lessen the liability of a university that shut down general operations before the
scheduled end of the year? Also along this same line of questioning: can a student
contract away his right to claim damages if he is not given a full or quality course of
study? If so, can this be done unknowingly by the student through a statement in
the bulletin exculpating the university?
The lower court decision in Paynter covered the above areas in its dictum. The
court stated: "The justification for a university is that it preserves connection
between knowledge and the zest of life, by uniting the young and the old in the
imaginative consideration of learning. The university imparts information, but it
imparts it imaginatively. At least this is the function which it should perform for
society. A university which fails in the respect has no reason for existence." 64
Misc. 2d 226, 228, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677.
"Indeed, in an effort to improve relations between students and faculty, in a
situation of persistent smouldering uneasiness which was then permeating its cam-
puses' atmosphere, Kent State University instituted a program two years ago in
which faculty members visited dormitories for informal discussions with students.
This program was dropped soon thereafter for lack of faculty interest. This court
shudders to wonder if the catastrophy which befell that college campus soon there-
after might not have been averted had this program been pursued." 64 Misc. 2d
226, 229, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678.
After admonishing the defendant university's administrators for acting in a man-
ner constituting "panic reaction to avoid violence and bloodshed instead of a
planned action" which would make them a "responsible force in social change," Judge
Picariello continued by stating, "[defendant's administrators] have failed to gauge the
tenor of contemporary social movements to be able, as is the function entrusted
above all to the university, with sufficient foresight, sensitivity, honesty, and courage
in the consideration of these developments, to help, guide, and give direction to our
society, and to do so with the full democratic participation of the students. To ex-
pect students to develop loyalty and commitment to democratic principles when,
in the ideal situation of intellectual exchange in the university, they have a voice
neither in the governance of their behavior nor the proper guidance in correct,
effective ways of expressing thoughts on such vital issues as the survival of the
individual, of the nation, and of humanity, and to offer by way of consolation the
fact that they have 'passed' courses, for which they have received grades, the sym-
bols, not the substance of knowledge, is to disappoint the hopes of students, of
parents, and of the nation." 64 Misc. 2d 226, 229-230, 314 N.Y.S.2d 676, 679.
Is a far-reaching deterioration of the relationship between student and university
administration the outcome if these problems are allowed to stand unchecked?
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tion in running its affairs for the safety and smooth operation of its in-
stitutional purposes. It is when these "necessary" powers come into
conflict with contractual and constitutional rights of students that the
discretion of the trustees must be questioned and scrutinized by the
courts. It is little wonder that the powers and practices of the trustees
have been questionedY96  In some cases, it appeared that the rights
of due process had been either suspended or neglected in the univer-
sities' exercise of their inherent discretionary powers. 7  The courts,
however, have refused to become involved whenever the use of "discre-
tion" was involved.98
The problem of inherent powers is not limited to the university
level. A suit has recently been filed in federal court to test the consti-
tutionality of the school expulsion law in Illinois.9 9 Hopefully, other
cases will arise at all educational levels to test the seemingly strong
home-rule authority that escapes the supervision of the judiciary.
There are questions that must be answered. The decision of Paynter
v. New York University cannot be dismissed lightly.
Samuel K. Bell
96. Supra note 81, at 1023.
97. Supra note 79, at 773.
98. Supra note 85. Will the judicial policy of "laissez-faire" allow college and
university administrators to control school policies totally unfettered? Since the
courts have said that they will step in only when the acts of the trustees are
capricious, who is to be the judge of the severity of the courts' actions?
The most pressing issue here is what can be done to restrain college administra-
tors from exercising injuriously uncontrolled power? Administrators manage col-
lege affairs for a body of students who contracted for an education. Why should
this viable agglomerate not be allowed to participate in the running of that which
they sustain to a great extent through their tuition payments? Judge Picariello
cautioned N.Y.U. and all universities to open channels of communication with their
respective student bodies. Students should take part in programs to improve their
schools, and administrators should permit and encourage this. Caution, however, to
the administrator who lets student representatives on to standing or ad hoe com-
mittees, and then ignores student wishes. He is merely throwing a sop to his
charges, which could (regrettably) be thrown back in his face in the heat of
multi-fold vehemence. May this unnecessary state of affairs not be permitted to
come about, by proper steps that are meant to be mature and effective.
99. Supra note 87.
